Karol Wotjyla, later Pope John Paul II, wrote an interesting essay entitled “The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates” in 1965. In this particular essay, Wojtyla describes what he considers to be the most difficult and yet ever-present problem in Catholic Sexual Ethics: the justification of sexual moral norms. The justification of sexual moral norms is much more difficult than the mere interpretation of sexual moral norms. He states very directly that "to justify the norms of morality means to give reasons for their rightness."

Wojtyla seems very willing to admit that the range of sexual moral theology where justification of moral norms is required is indeed quite large. As a simple example, he says, "I do not believe that one can or even should regard marriage alone...as the material object of Catholic sexual ethics." He later states that "because God endowed them with physical and psychological sexual properties and a sexual urge...These properties and this urge are found in every human being outside of marriage as well, and so they need to be ordered from the perspective of the principles of morality not only within marriage but also outside of it."

Still, Wojtyla attempts to address this problem by first describing personalism and naturalism. In personalism, he states that the “sexual properties and the sexual urge in humans are always and in every instance attributes of a person,” much like what he describes in his book Love and Responsibility. Sexual properties and urges are inherent in a person, but their actions are not. In other words, people choose to act. They are not robots controlled by nature—as would be the view of a naturalist. In fact, people are more than merely natural beings and possess the ability to control many types of desires, including those in the sexual realm. People are people, not merely homo sapiens.

Wojtyla describes the fact that even in the personalistic view though, there are easy traps which lead to naturalism:

1) A man and a woman may be treated primarily as objects who are bearers of an urge, rather than as conscious and free subjects--that is, as people--capable of good, including sexual good.
2) Sexual actions as responses to desires may be treated too deterministically. That is, sexual responses—particularly psychological sexual responses—may be treated as though they simply “happen” within human beings. (Wojtyla again counters that people are more than merely human beings who can shape response or at least intervene in how they respond.)
3) Another trap of naturalism is the tendency to limit the possibility of virtue and magnify the “necessity of sin.” This is quite the opposite of personalism, which believes that sexual responses are self-determined, not naturally deterministic. In other words, sexual responses are always a choice, not required by our nature.

This discussion of personalism versus naturalism is all to provide a framework for Wojtyla to deal with the two most fundamental sexual norms:
1) The sexual urge, by choice and personal control, can be properly used for respect of a person of the opposite sex.
2) We can treat others with the dignity they deserve, for they are people with inherent value.

In other words, because people have inherent value and we are able to control our urges, we should love people--sexually or not--as this is at the heart of the Gospel. On the other hand, as Wojtyla says, "when the purpose of the urge is not respected...we then have the opposite of love of the person, which may be defined as using the person. An improper relation to the purpose of the urge either within or outside of marriage has repercussions on the plane of the personalistic norm. It results in making a person, who ought to be an object of love, merely an object of use." As he says elsewhere:

We should instill in consciousness the conviction that

1) the value of the person is higher and more important than the sexual values connected with the person, and

2) love of the person, even when in some sense based on the factor of sexuality, is not synonymous with being sexually involved with someone.

Upon defining and describing the key sexual moral norms, Wojtyla goes on to describe the issues in not just defining norms in a personalistic manner, but of actually giving them force, per justification of the norms. Somewhat surprisingly, Wojtyla does so by appealing to the order of nature, while still pointing to the personalistic norm. In such a way, he brings together the plane of personhood and the plane of nature in an interesting way: "by pointing to the person as a subject who is conscious of the order of nature and responsible for preserving it."

Still, Wojtyla deals in a very real manner with those things which make his objective arguments easily lost on many people. As he states quite directly:

I realize that the objective validity of an argument is one thing and its actual force or effectiveness in influencing beliefs and thus indirectly shaping actions and virtues is another...The following circumstances work against an understanding of my argument:

1) the habit of thinking and judging in a utilitarian way;

2) the inclination to judge the value of an act solely on the basis of its effects;

3) the enormous pressure exerted by the subjective, emotional element...

All of these circumstances in various ways affect the force and practical effectiveness of my argument.

In such a way, Wojtyla identifies not just what we are told to believe, but the "practical force and effectiveness" of objective arguments. This problem of justification is indeed a tough one, for: "Moral norms are valid independently of the effectiveness in practice, and yet the moralist, whose main task is to seek arguments for their objective validity, or correctness, cannot entirely neglect the aspect of their practical effectiveness." In other words "neither the plane of the order of nature nor even the plane of the personalistic norm is yet an ultimate and complete basis for formulating a comprehensive justification of the norms of Catholic sexual ethics."

And yet: "Above the order of nature there is still the order of grace, which is connected in the most intimate way with the world of persons."

This all leads up to dealing with the problem of teaching Catholic sexual morality in such a way that not only the teaching is understood, but that it is actually believed and followed (through justification of the norms).

Catholic sexual pedagogy takes the position that educating people in the sexual sphere involves more than just providing them with sexological instruction. Education, after all, is not a function of knowledge alone, but is also a function of the will molding conduct.

Further, we should approach all sexual education from a position of love:

the most essential (because the most Christian) and also...the most difficult task in the area of sex education is to incorporate properly all the contributions of science in the integral order of love. They should be incorporated from the very start and also in a progressive, ongoing way.

To summarize, "The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics" is essentially a piece identifying the problems with justification of Catholic sexual moral norms (due to social conditioning already present in people) and with teaching these objectively valid norms. Wojtyla essentially provides a framework for future Catholic sexual morality theologians to deal with new lines of thought against valid Catholic sexual moral norms. He also describes the key here: to remembering the inherent value of all people.